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Abstract
We investigate whether joining the European Monetary Union and losing the ability
to set monetary policy affected the economic growth of 12 Eurozone countries. We use
the synthetic control approach to create a counterfactual scenario for how each Eu-
rozone country would have evolved without adopting the Euro. We let this matching
algorithm determine which combination of other developed economies best resembles
the pre-Euro path of twelve Eurozone economies. Our estimates suggest that there
were some mild losers (France, Germany, Italy, and Portugal) and a clear winner (Ire-
land). Nevertheless, a GDP decomposition analysis suggests that the drivers of the
economic gains and losses are heterogeneous.
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“For all the seven long years since the signing of the Maastricht treaty started Europe
on the road to that unified currency, critics have warned that the plan was an invitation to
disaster.” (Krugman, 1998)
1 Introduction
In January 1999, the exchange rates between member countries’ national currencies and
the euro were fixed irrevocably and the European Central Bank officially took over the
responsibility of conducting the unified monetary policy. Twenty years have passed since
the Euro was launched and the member states gave up the ability to set their own monetary
policy. In this work, we evaluate whether joining the Euro had any macroeconomic effect
for twelve of the Eurozone countries.
To address this question, we develop a counterfactual scenario which represents how
each Eurozone country would have evolved without adopting the Euro as their currency.
For this analysis, we employ what is arguably the most important innovation in the policy
evaluation literature in the last fifteen years - the synthetic control method (Athey and
Imbens (2017)). We let this matching algorithm determine which combination of other
OECD advanced economies best resembles the pre-Euro path of each Eurozone member. We
then compare the post-Euro macroeconomic performance of each economy to its synthetic
doppelganger. In particular, by decomposing the countries’ and the doppelgangers’ GDP
into their components, we identify the main drivers of the accession gains and losses.
In the context of the Eurozone, it was expected that adopting a common currency
would reduce the exchange rate volatility, the transaction costs, and any price discrimi-
nation (De Grauwe, 2020). Most likely, it could also spur trade and investment within the
Euro area (Frankel and Rose (1998)). Notwithstanding, since its announcement many have
been calling into question the success of the Euro (Wyplosz, 2006). They believed that the
Eurozone did not satisfy the requirements of an Optimum Currency Area, especially due to
the lack of labor mobility (Jonung, Drea, et al., 2009). Additionally, the Euro area countries
could no longer set monetary policy independently thus becoming more exposed to external
(asymmetric) shocks. Still nowadays, the rising strength of nationalism movements in Eu-
rope has intensified the doubts about the advantages of the Eurozone (Fligstein et al. (2012),
Guiso et al. (2019)). Some of the arguments put forward are the loss of sovereignty and the
suitability of the monetary policy undertaken to all member states.
Our contribution is two folded. First, we evaluate the macroeconomic impact of adopting
the Euro measured by the real GDP. Theoretical predictions about this effect are ambiguous
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and depend on whether the costs outweigh the benefits of joining the Eurozone.1 Indeed,
we find that there are some mild losers (France, Germany, Italy, and Portugal) and a clear
winner (Ireland). Such heterogeneous findings are in line with De Grauwe (2020) who warns
us not to be overoptimistic on economic growth stemming from an inharmonious monetary
union.
Next, we investigate which were the channels driving the output gains and losses and if
they differed from country to country. For Ireland, the private consumption and investment
notably explain almost 80% of the total output gain from joining the Euro. While for
France and Portugal, the private consumption and the net exports accounted for a large
share of the economic loss, in the case of Germany and Italy, the private consumption and
the investment explain the negative impact of the Euro. For most countries, the trade volume
was significantly higher than if they had not joined the Eurozone. Nonetheless, the common
currency had a positive impact on the trade balance solely for Germany and Ireland.
Literature Review: This paper is related to two strands of the literature. The first one
is directly related to the methodology used to construct the counterfactuals. To employ the
Synthetic Control Method (SCM), we follow the original work by Abadie and Gardeazabal
(2003), Abadie et al. (2010) and (2015) who developed the methodology.2 Furthermore, we
follow more recent work by Campos et al. (2018) who evaluate the impact of the European
Union accession, Born et al. (2019) who assess the macroeconomic impact of the election of
Donald Trump as the President of the USA, and finally Breinlich et al. (2020) and Born et
al. (2020) who study the costs of economic nationalism by looking at the Brexit vote impact
on the transactions and GDP, respectively.
In particular, this paper closely relates to the recent literature about the Euro adoption
using the synthetic control approach (Ferna´ndez and Garcia-Perea (2015), Verstegen et al.
(2017), and Gasparotti and Kullas (2019) among others). We build directly on the work of
Puzzello and Gomis-Porqueras (2018) by extending their analysis from six to twelve member
states which joined the Euro until 2007. Furthermore, we investigate the channels that drove
the economic gains and losses of the accession.
This paper also contributes to the literature that studies the macroeconomic impact
of joining a currency union. Starting from the groundbreaking contribution of Mundell
(1961) on the theory of optimal currency areas, many economists have been studying the
key characteristics that allow a group of countries to benefit from having the same currency.
(McKinnon, 1963) and Kenen (1969) have added seminal contributions to this theory by
1We refer the reader to Lane (2006) and Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010) who provide a more recent
account of the real effects of the EMU by surveying the literature on its macroeconomic costs and benefits.
2A good overview of the literature using this methodology can be found in Abadie (2019).
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exploring the role of international trade and diversified output structures in determining the
costs and benefits of joining a monetary union.
More recent work from Alesina and Barro (2002) explains that forgoing monetary policy,
on the one hand, implies losing a stabilization device to deal with domestic shocks but, on
the other hand, can boost credibility and price stability. Alesina and Barro (2002) show
that if there is a reduction in trading costs, the adoption of a common currency has a direct
positive effect on trade, output, and consumption.3
There is also a broad literature which tests empirically these theoretical links. At about
the time the euro was launched, Rose (2000) famously estimated that a currency union could
boost up to three times bilateral trade. The relevance of these results to the euro case was
immediately doubted since the sample used for the analysis was based on unions of small,
poor, and remote countries. Micco et al. (2003) developed the first comprehensive study for
the impact of the EMU on trade, concluding that the Euro had a positive impact not only
on trade between member states but also with third parties.
Some papers have also highlighted the impact currency unions on investment. Among
others, Barr, Breedon, and Miles (2003) suggest that inward investment in the countries out-
side the union would have been greater if they had joined the EMU. Furthermore, De Sousa
and Lochard (2011) estimate that, in the Eurozone countries, investment increased with the
single currency adoption.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the construction
of the doppelganger, its implementation and the data used. Section 3 presents the results
and performs robustness exercises. Section 4 explores the potential channels through which
the Euro adoption affected the GDP. We briefly conclude in Section 5.
3Alesina, Barro, and Tenreyro (2002) and Barro and Tenreyro (2007) empirically investigate and present
evidence in accordance with these theoretical predictions.
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2 Constructing the doppelganger
2.1 The synthetic control method
To measure the impact of the European Monetary Union accession on the macroeco-
nomic performance of the Eurozone countries, we construct a doppelganger for each Euro-
zone country based on the synthetic control methodology (SCM) developed by Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003), Abadie et al. (2010) and (2015).4 Ideally, these doppelgangers behave
just like the Eurozone economies, except that they did not adopt the Euro.
The goal is to compute the treatment effect of a policy intervention:
τi,t ≡ Y
I
i,t − Y
C
i,t
where Y Ii,t represents the realized outcome of country i in period t and Y
C
i,t stands for
the non-observable outcome country i would have had in period t absent from the policy
intervention. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) proposed the SCM to estimate Y Ci,t by con-
structing a doppelganger as a weighted average of the outcomes of non-treated units. We
refer to these units as “donor countries” and to the set of these countries as “donor pool”
throughout the paper. Suppose that we have N + 1 countries and country i = 1 is exposed
to the intervention of interest. Then, an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect, which we
refer to as doppelganger gap throughout this paper, is:
τˆ1,t = Y
I
1,t −
N+1∑
i=2
wiYi,t (1)
where wi is the estimated weight assigned to donor country i used to construct the
doppelganger.
The weights are chosen to minimize the difference between each treated unit and its
doppelganger’s pre-intervention outcome variable and predictors. The outcome variable
studied is real GDP and the set of predictors used is based on Abadie and Gardeazabal
(2003) and Born et al. (2019). These predictors are the average GDP shares of private
consumption, government consumption, investment, exports, imports, the employed share
of population, the labor productivity growth, the real GDP and its lags.5
Formally, we let x1 denote the (37 × 1) vector of 30 observations for real GDP and
7 covariates’ averages in each Eurozone country and X0 denote a (37 × 14) matrix with
observations from the donor countries. Finally, we let w denote a (14× 1) vector of weights
4A detailed exposition of the method can be find in Abadie (2019).
5We avoid the so-called cherry picking problem in Ferman et al. (2020) by choosing a standard set of
predictors based on previous empirical literature.
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wi, i = 2, ..., 15. Then, the optimal weighting scheme is defined by w
∗ which minimizes the
following mean squared error:
(x1 −X0w)
′V(x1 −X0w) (2)
subject to:
wi ≥ 0 for i = 2, ..., 15 (3)
15∑
i=2
wi = 1 (4)
where V is a (14 × 14) symmetric and positive semidefinite weighting matrix assigning
different relevance to the characteristics in x1 and X0. Following Abadie and Gardeaza-
bal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010), we choose a diagonal V matrix such that the mean
squared prediction error of the outcome variable (and the covariates) is minimized for the
pre-treatment period.6
2.1.1 Implementation
The SCM offers several advantages to study the question at hands. This method is
transparent regarding the construction of the counterfactual and the fit of the control unit
to the treated unit. It provides the exact weigh of each donor country for the construction of
the doppelganger. The fit of the counterfactual can be inspected by comparing the outcome
variable and other characteristics of the treated unit with the estimated data. It is also
important to highlight that this method allows the design decisions like choice of donor
pool and predictors to be made regardless of the post-treatment considerations and without
knowing the implication for the results and conclusions. Moreover, the SCM precludes
extrapolation since the estimated weights are non-negative and sum to one.7
To successfully implement the SCM several contextual and data requirements should be
satisfied.8 Especially for estimating causal effects, the credibility of the results severely de-
pends on whether these requirements are met in the empirical application at hand. Therefore,
we now present these requirements and how we address them.
First, treated units and the donor countries should be comparable. The counterfactual
6Including the covariates in the optimization differs from Kaul et al. (2018) who have raised concerns
about including all pre-intervention outcomes together with covariates when using the SCM. The covariates
used are relevant for the computation of the doppelgangers and its choice hinged on theoretical grounds.
7See King and Zeng (2006) for more information about the dangers of relying on extrapolation to estimate
counterfactuals
8See Abadie (2019) for more detail on these requirements.
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should be identical to the treated unit in all dimensions except for the treatment assignment.
When the treated unit is a country, an “ideal” control unit rarely exists in observed data
because countries differ widely across demographic, legislative and economic characteristics
(Born et al., 2020). Yet, the donor pool selection should try to accommodate this need.
Unlike Puzzello and Gomis-Porqueras (2018) and Gasparotti and Kullas (2019), we ensure
that the donor countries can resemble the level of economic and social development of the
treated units by using only OECD economies in our baseline estimates. It is important
to “restrict the donor pool to units with outcomes that are thought to be driven by the
structural process as for the unit representing the case of interest” (Abadie et al., 2015).
When using developing countries with structurally higher growth rates to create a dop-
pelganger for an advanced economy with structurally more modest growth rates, results are
condemned to be biased. Using a smaller donor pool that guarantees more similarities with
the treated unit should be preferred, albeit the expected poorer fit (Abadie & Gardeazabal,
2003).
Secondly, since the counterfactual weights are constructed according to the pre-intervention
characteristics, we have to assure that there are no (external) differentiated shocks during
the study period in the donor pool countries (Abadie (2019)). To account for this issue, con-
trarily to Ferna´ndez and Garcia-Perea (2015) and Verstegen et al. (2017), we only consider
observations until 2007. From 2008 onward, the Great Recession affected countries in very
different ways and arguably provoked structural changes in the affected economies.
It is also important to exclude any country that was treated from the donor pool. In this
context, this is addressed by using only donor countries which never adopted the Euro.
Furthermore, policy interventions frequently have spillover effects to non-treated units.
When employing the SCM, it is important to ensure that the counterfactuals are not affected
by the treatment. In the context of our analysis, this is equivalent to ruling out the possibility
that the Euro adoption by an individual country affected the income of the donor countries.
This assumption is tested by performing in-space placebo testes in section 3.2.2.
Fourth, the intervention has no effect on the outcome before the implementation period.
In section 3.2.1, potential anticipation effects are tested by changing the treatment date used
in the analysis.
The SCM requires as well a sizable number of pre- and post-intervention periods. In the
literature, previous SCM applications with yearly data use between 20 (Abadie & Gardeaz-
abal, 2003) and 30 pre-treatment periods (Abadie et al., 2015). The reason is that the credi-
bility of a synthetic control depends upon how well it tracks the treated unit’s characteristics
and outcomes over an extended period of time prior to the treatment. The post-treatment
period should be long enough to account for delayed or dissipated effects of the intervention.
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These requirements are satisfied with the data used in analysis as discussed next in section .
Finally, it is important to guarantee that there are no extreme values in the variable of
interest for the treated units. The SCM is based on the idea that a combination of unaffected
units can approximate the pre-intervention characteristics of the affected unit. However, if
the treated unit exhibits “extreme” values for the outcome variables this is not possible. We
address this issue by normalizing real GDP to unity in 1970.
2.2 Data and Sample
We use annual data since 1970 until 2007 from the Penn World Tables, version 9.1 (PWT
9.1 - Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015)) and the World Bank. We focus on the real
GDP as our main outcome variable and conduct our analysis on twelve Eurozone countries,
namely Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.9
We assume the treatment date takes place in 1999 for all countries except for Greece,
which joined the Eurozone later in 2001. In our baseline estimate, we have at least 29
pre-intervention periods, from 1970 to 1998, which is sufficiently large to apply the SCM.
Doppelgangers are constructed on the basis of a donor pool of 14 countries selected as
follows. First, only OECD countries are used to ensure that doppelgangers are sufficiently
similar to the treated countries. Then, all countries that joined the European Union or the
Eurozone during the post-treatment period are excluded. This guarantees that the donor
countries are neither affected by the treatment nor suffer a differentiated external shock
during the post-treatment period.
For our baseline estimates, we do not restrict the donor pool further except for countries
for which the necessary data is not available. The pool is composed of Australia, Canada,
Chile, Denmark, Iceland, Israel, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom, and the United States.
We believe this donor pool of countries is just narrow enough to guarantee that these
donor countries are comparable to the treated units but do not compromise the application
of the SCM and estimation of the counterfactuals. Possible flukes to this belief are assessed
in section 3.3.1 where we perform robustness checks by excluding individual and groups of
countries from the donor pool.
9The outcome variable is normalized to unity in 1970 in each country. Consult Table 2 for further details
on the data. Focusing on the normalized per capita real GDP instead does not change the results.
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3 Empirical Results
This section starts by presenting the baseline results for the impact of the euro acces-
sion. Next, taking into account the assumptions discussed in Section 2.1.1, we discuss the
statistically significance and causality of these results by performing two types of placebo
exercises. First, we apply in-space placebo tests in Section 3.2.2 which assign the treatment
to all countries in the donor pool. Then, in Section 3.2.1, we perform in-time placebo tests
in which placebo treatment dates are assigned to the treated countries.
The main findings in this section corroborate the results of Puzzello and Gomis-Porqueras
(2018) and adds new insights by concluding that the results for France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, and Portugal are statistically significant.
3.1 Baseline results: Assessing Euro’s macroeconomic impact
It is expected that the SCM yields an imperfect pre-treatment match for some countries
given that our procedure determines 14 parameters (country weights) to match 37 observa-
tions. Notwithstanding, this methodology can provide substantial improvement relative to
alternative methods as differences-in-differences (Ferman & Pinto, 2019) and thus, we are
confident that this data-driven approach is the best to study the problem at hands.
Table 4 displays the donor country weights that constitute each doppelganger. For in-
stance, the synthetic Spain is composed by all countries in the donor pool yet being signif-
icantly constructed using data from the United States (46%), Mexico (19%), Switzerland
(18%), and Australia (16%). We are overall confident on the plausibility and credibility of
the methodology weighting scheme.10
Table 3 shows that doppelgangers are very similar to the actual countries when comparing
their predictors means despite using the same specification for all countries.11 Furthermore,
in section A.7, we show that the doppelgangers are successful in recovering the time path of
all GDP components for most of the analyzed countries.
Figure 1 displays the real GDP for each country (full black line) and doppelganger (dashed
blue line) presented as the deviation from the first year of the sample in percent. The shaded
area represents two standard deviations of the pre-treatment difference between the actual
and the counterfactual series. When the doppelganger series deviates from the realized path
in such a way that exceeds these bounds, it indicates that such deviation is non-standard
compared to the pre-Euro period.
10Potential concerns regarding the use of countries which belong to the Exchange Rate Mechanism (Den-
mark, Sweden and United Kingdom) are addressed in Section 3.3.1.
11Matching only the key variable might suffice but having further similarities in related variables is also
important and ensures the robustness of the findings (Botosaru & Ferman, 2019).
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Figure 1: The impact of the Eurozone accession
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Notes: In each graph, the dashed line represents the normalized real GDP for the synthetic country
and the continuous line represents the series for the actual country. The vertical line represents
the treatment period - 1999 for all countries except for Greece which is 2001. For each country the
analysis starts in 1970 and ends in 2007.
A number of observations stand out. The pre-treatment paths for most countries and their
doppelgangers are overlapping. In fact, Figure 1 shows some series embarking on a different
growth trajectory relative to their counterfactuals only around the Eurozone creation.
Table 1 presents the exact doppelganger gaps measured in Euro per capita. Ireland
benefited the most from the Euro adoption. Its GDP per capita was 10,781 Euro higher due
to the common currency adoption. However, France, Germany, Italy and Portugal would be
better off by not participating in this currency union. Yet, Germany and Italy lost the most
- 5,788 and 6,089 Euro per capita respectively.
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Table 1: Doppelganger Gap
AUT BEL FIN FRA DEU GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT ESP
Gap
-1,712 -1,668 777 -2,632 -5,788 -1,098 10,781 -6,089 4,697 168 -2,558 900
(Euros per capita)
Notes: This table presents the doppelganger output gap per capita in 2007. This measure is
obtained by adjusting the real GDP gap for the population size and converting 2011 US dollars
into 2011 Euro. We use the conversion rate available from the PWT 9.1 for this year (≈ 0.73).
3.2 Causality
A key assumption to study the impact of a policy intervention is that there is no reverse
causality. In our context, this means that countries must not have adopted the Euro due to
economic considerations. This assumption is plausible because the Eurozone accession was
driven mainly by political rather than economic factors (Eichengreen and Frieden (1993),
Feldstein (1997)). In fact, by not satisfying the requirements of an Optimum Currency
Area, many economists believed that countries adopting the Euro would face economic losses
(Jonung et al., 2009). This argument holds even for the Greek case which had decided to
join the Euro before the single currency was a reality.12
Sections 2.1.1 and 2.2 discussed the conditions under which the SCM provides suitable
estimates of causal effects and this paper address some of these requirements. To further back
the notion that the doppelganger gap is indeed caused by the referendum shock, Sections
3.2.1 and 3.2.2 provides a number of placebo experiments and robustness checks. The basic
idea of the placebos is very intuitive. We can be confident that the synthetic control estimator
captures the causal effect of an intervention as long as similar magnitudes are not estimated
in cases where the intervention did not take place (Born et al., 2020). Finally, Section
discusses the statistical significance of the results 3.2.3.
3.2.1 In-time placebo test: anticipation effects
On 7 February 1992, representatives from twelve countries signed the Maastricht Treaty
– Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. Upon signing the it, these member countries knew
that a monetary union, with a central banking system and common currency, was to be
created within the next years. It is therefore reasonable to think that countries experienced
at least partly the Eurozone accession even before the Euro was launched.
12According to the 1998 convergence report from the European Commission, Greece did not join the single
currency in 1999 because it had not fulfil any of the four convergence criteria. Notwithstanding, the decision
of joining was already made.
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To check for anticipation effects of the Euro adoption, we perform in-time placebo tests
by inspecting different intervention periods in our analysis. We take the date the Maas-
tricht Treaty was signed as the placebo treatment period. Figure 2 suggests that the main
conclusions from Figure 1 remain unchanged.
We ran further time-placebo tests in which the placebo treatment date is set artificially
to be every year since 1992 until 1998. For the sake of brevity, besides the Maastricht Treaty
date 1992, we only report the tests for 1995 and 1998 in Figures 8 and 9. Reassuringly, the
results remain unaltered.13
Figure 2: In-time placebo tests
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Notes: In each graph, the blue dashed line represents the normalized real GDP for the synthetic
country and the black full line represents the series for the actual country. The vertical line depicts
the placebo treatment period - 1992 for all countries. For all countries the analysis starts in 1970
and ends in 2007.
Yet, Figure 2 presents some evidence in favour of the existence of anticipation effects for
several countries. In some cases, the gap between the actual and the synthetic series becomes
13The remaining figures can be provided by the authors upon request.
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wider than the one analyzed in Figure 1. Still, these figures should be analysed carefully.
For example, the plot for Greece show some effect that starts even before the the placebo
treatment of 1992. This anticipated effect seems to be driven by the Greek EU accession in
1981 and not from the Euro.
Furthermore, estimates for Austria and Finland must be interpreted carefully as these
countries entered the EU exactly in 1995 and the placebo treatment effect may be biased.
The doppelganger gaps for Belgium, France and Italy are wider than in Figure 1 but the di-
rection of the effect remains unchanged. Ignoring possible anticipation effects in our baseline
estimate may lead to a lower bound estimate of the Euro impact for these countries.
The absence of anticipation effects for the remaining countries may be due to two things.
First, the key event representing a change for most European citizens was the irrevocably
the exchange rate fix in 31st December 1998 and the Euro launch in the 1st of January
1999. Second, most of these countries had already experienced trade and economic gains
from joining the European Union (Campos et al., 2018). Therefore, such effects lie in our
pre-treatment sample and thus, are being already considered.
3.2.2 In-space placebo test
Following Abadie et al. (2010), Abadie and Cattaneo (2018), and Firpo and Possebom
(2018), we employ the synthetic control methodology on the donor pool countries while
exposing them to a placebo treatment in 1999. The idea is to sequentially “re-assign”
the treatment to all units in the donor pool and, for each of them, estimate a fictitious
doppelganger using the remaining donor countries and the originally treated unit. We repeat
this process for every treated country.
Next, we compare the post and pre-treatment behavior of these series and inspect the
differences between treated and fictionally treated units. If our benchmark estimates for
each Eurozone country are picking up the causal effect of the Euro accession, these should
dominate any possible impact of the fictitious event in the donor countries. On the other
hand, if no difference is found, then most likely the actual intervention had no effect. Ap-
plying this idea to each country in the donor pool allows us to compare the estimated effect
of the Euro accession on Eurozone countries to the distribution of placebo effects obtained
for the other countries (Abadie et al., 2015).
The plots from Figure 3 depict the doppelganger gap, that is, the differences between
each countries’ normalized GDP and their doppelgangers’ estimates. The smaller the gap for
the pre-treatment period, the better the fit of the synthetic series to the outcome variable.
Countries with a bad pre-intervention fit are excluded from the in-space placebo test because
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Figure 3: In-space placebo tests
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Notes: The plotted lines represent the prediction error for the treated country (black) and donor countries
(grey) for which we impose a fictitious Euro accession. Following the literature, we plot the donor countries
whose pre-treatment MSPE was four times larger than the one of the treated country.
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they are not suited to inform about the post-treatment effect.14
Visually, Figure 3 reinforces the findings in Figure 1. When comparing the full black
lines from each Euro-adopter country to the grey lines of fictitious treated units, it is clear
that, for some countries, the post-treatment gap is unusually bigger. Specifically, it suggests
a positive impact of the Euro accession on Ireland and Luxembourg and a negative impact,
if any, on France, Germany, Italy, and Portugal.
3.2.3 Statistical Significance
To evaluate the statistical significance of our estimates and following Abadie et al. (2010)
and Abadie and Cattaneo (2018), we use a test based on the classic framework for permu-
tation inference which builds on the computations presented in the previous section.
Given our estimates of all fictional treatment effects in the previous section, we can
evaluate the statistical significance by computing a p-value associated with the treatment.
First, we compute the ratio of mean squared prediction errors in the post-intervention period
relative to the pre-intervention period for treated and fictitiously treated units as follows:
χ ≡
RMSPEpost
RMSPEpre
≡
√
1
T−T0+1
T∑
t=T0
(x1,t − x0,tw)2√
1
T0−1
T0−1∑
t=1
(x1,t − x0,tw)2
(5)
where x1,t denotes the GDP of the treated country at period t, x0,t denotes a vector of
observations of GDP for the donor countries in period t, w denotes a vector of weights for
the donor countries, T denotes the total number of periods, and T0 denotes the treatment
date.
This statistic already allows a quantitative analysis of the treatment effect taking into
account the quality of the match produced by the SCM. A small pre-treatment RMSPE
implies a good fit of the synthetic series to the actual series and a large post-treatment
RMSPE suggests, for the treated units, a large intervention impact. Therefore, obtaining a
larger ratio for the treated unit than for the placebo treated units would entail a significant
treatment effect.15
Figure 4 depicts this relative measure for the Eurozone countries and its donors. Ireland
14We define a good pre-intervention fit following Firpo and Possebom (2018) when the pre-intervention
MSPE of a donor country is at most four times greater than the Eurozone country’s pre-intervention MSPE
being analyzed.
15A large post-intervention RMSPE per se is not indicative of a large effect of the intervention. It depends
on whether the synthetic control can reproduce closely the outcome of interest prior to the intervention
(Abadie, 2019).
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clearly stands out as the country with the highest RMSPE ratio with a post-intervention
gap about 16 times larger than its pre-intervention gap.
Figure 4: Ratio between the post- and pre-treatment RMSPE
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Notes: The plots show the ratio between the post- and the pre-intervention RMSPE for the treated
units (in black) and all donor countries (in grey).
We deem the effect of the Euro adoption significant if the estimated effect for the treated
units is unusually large relative to the distribution of the placebo effects. To test this in
practise, we compute a p-value which compares the value of the RMSPE for the treated
country to that of all other units as follows:
ρ1 =
N+1∑
i=1
I(χi ≥ χ1)
N + 1
(6)
where I(.) denotes the indicator function, N the number of donor countries, χ1 the
RMSPE ratio for the treated unit and χi is the RMSPE ratio for country i which can be a
donor or the treated country.
Table 5 presents the RMSPE ratios, (χ), for all countries in the baseline analysis and
correspondent p-values for the treated units. If one were to pick a country at random from
the Irish sample, the chances of obtaining a ratio as high as the Irish would be 1/15 =
0.067 which we consider to be statistically significant. A closer look at Table 5 and Figure
4 shows that Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Germany, and France experienced a significant effect
from adopting the Euro.
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3.3 Further robustness checks
3.3.1 Changes to donor pool
This section addresses two concerns. On the one hand, some countries in the control
group may have opted out of the treatment. This would suggest a reverse causality problem
and raise doubts about the credibility of the results presented. As discussed in the beginning
of Section 3.2, countries used in the analysis must not have opted in or out due to economic
considerations.
In fact, the UK, Sweden and Denmark belonged to the European Union at the time
but did not adopt the common currency. Even though, they did opted out due to political
reasons, we still address this issue by excluding these countries altogether from the donor
pool. We redo our analysis with this new pool and the results are presented in Figure 5. The
main conclusions remain unchanged for all the Eurozone countries. With special attention
for the ones whose doppelgangers’ construction highly relied on this trio - Austria, Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, and Portugal.
On the other hand, there might have been spillover effects of the treatment onto the
donor countries. We address this issue by iteratively re-estimating our baseline estimate for
each Eurozone country excluding in each iteration one of the countries with positive weight.
We display this robustness check for countries that contribute with, at least, 10% for the
construction of, at least, 2 countries’ doppelgangers in Section A.6. This exercise shows that
no particular donor country is driving the main conclusions.16 So, it is unlikely that spillover
effects nor one specific country in the donor pool are driving the results.
3.3.2 Changes in the sample period
The credibility of the SCM results severely depends on whether the requirements specified
on Section 2.1.1 are satisfied. One of these requirements was that countries should not
experience differentiated shocks during the sample period. Several analysed countries joined
the European Union during the pre-treatment period which may concern the most attentive
reader.
For countries which joined the EU at least 10 years before the Eurozone creation, we
re-do the estimates using their accession data as the start of our sample, i.e. Ireland (1973),
Greece (1981), Portugal and Spain (1986). From Figure 6, it is possible to conclude that the
conclusions from the baseline analysis are robust.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to re-estimate the results for Austria and Finland because
16For the sake of brevity, the figures for all the remaining countries are not reported, but they can be
provided by the authors upon request. The results remain qualitatively unchanged.
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Figure 5: Impact of the Euro accession with a change in the donor pool
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Notes: In each graph, the blue dashed line represents the normalized real GDP for the synthetic
country and the black full line represents the series for the actual country. The vertical line depicts
the treatment period - 2001 for Greece and 1999 for the remaining countries. For all countries the
analysis starts in 1970 and ends in 2007. Relative to the baseline analysis, the donor pool now
excludes Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Table 6 show the weights used to construct
these results.
they joined the EU in 1995. Yet, according Campos et al. (2018), Austria and Finland were
not significantly affected by the EU accession and thus we believe that this does not pose a
problem in our analysis.
4 What drives the doppelganger gap?
In this section, we take one step further and investigate what drives the results presented
in Figure 1 by decomposing the Euro accession response of GDP into the response of its
components. First, we look at the evolution of each GDP component for both countries and
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Figure 6: The impact of the Euro accession with a change in the sample period
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Notes: In each graph, the blue dashed line represents the normalized real GDP for the synthetic
country and the black full line represents the series for the actual country. The vertical line depicts
the treatment period - 1999 for Ireland, Greece, and Portugal and 2001 for Greece. The analysis
starts in 1973 for Ireland, 1981 for Greece, and 1986 for Portugal and Spain. For all countries the
analysis ends in 2007.
corresponding counterfactuals. Then, we try to understand what explains the output gains
and losses from the accession by accounting the role of each component for the doppelganger
GDP gap. We find that countries were affected by the event through different channels.
4.1 The impact of the Eurozone accession on GDP components
In Appendix A.7, we present the GDP decomposition for all countries and doppelgangers.
The synthetic shares of GDP components were constructed using the weights estimated
in Section 2 and the data from the donor countries. Similarly to the construction of the
synthetic GDP series, we now compute the synthetic shares of each GDP component as a
weighted average of the shares of GDP components for the donor countries. Namely, we
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obtain GDP shares of private consumption, investment, government consumption, exports,
and imports.
We aim at understanding how the components evolved over time and, in particular, after
the Euro accession. To do that, we use each component share and the GDP series to compute
the five GDP components series for both countries and doppelgangers. Finally, these series
are normalized to unity in 1970. The results are presented in Appendix A.7.
It is important to highlight that comparing the actual and the synthetic series from
Appendix A.7 also indicates whether the doppelganger can really mimic the behaviour of
each country prior to the Euro accession. We must recall that the construction of the
doppelganger in Section 2 does not target the time path of GDP components and thus, a
good fit in this regard can not be taken for granted (Born et al., 2020). Overall, the figures
from Appendix A.7 reassure us of the fit of the SCM estimates.
With respect to the clear winner, Ireland, Figure 22 shows that all its GDP components
increase consistently since the beginning of the sample and a gap between the actual and
synthetic series materializes around the Euro accession date. In particular, investment and
government consumption deviate significantly from their counterfactuals. The Eurozone
accession especially stimulated their growth.
Even though Figure 1 and Table 5 display significant negative treatment effect on the
economic growth of France, Germany, Italy, and Portugal, these countries seem to have been
affected through different channels. Figures 20 and 23 indicate that private consumption
and investment would have grown more if these country had not adopted the Euro. On
the other hand, the treatment output loss in France and Portugal seems to be driven by a
smaller net exports growth after the accession, as Figures 19 and 26 suggest.
The remaining countries, not significantly affected by the treatment, do not exhibit large
differences in the GDP components’ growth relative to their counterfactuals. Appendix A.7
also depicts a larger acceleration in the trade volume driven by the Eurozone accession for
almost all analyzed countries. This finding is in accordance with empirical works departing
from Rose (2000), Glick and Rose (2002), and Frankel and Rose (2002) who argue that
countries sharing the same currency trade two to three times as much as they would with
different currencies. Moreover, regarding trade with third parties, Micco et al. (2003) explains
that the monetary union increases trade not just with EMU countries, but also with the rest
of the world. Even though the treatment seems to have affected both imports and exports,
we corroborate the negative impact on the growth of net exports in most cases as documented
in Hope (2016). The common currency had solely a positive impact on trade balance growth
for Germany and Ireland.
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4.2 What explains the cumulative doppelganger gap?
The previous section discussed the growth patterns of the GDP components for the
countries and their counterfactuals. In this Section, we compute the contribution of each
GDP component for the output gap generated by the treatment. In section 2.1, equation
1 defines doppelganger gap as the difference in outcome variable (here, real GDP) between
the treated and the synthetic country. The cumulative treatment effect can be estimated by
computing the doppelganger gap for t = 2007, the last year of our analysis.
Now, we proceed to quantify the contribution of each component for the output dop-
pelganger gap in four steps. Analogously to Equation 1 for output, we start by computing
doppelganger gaps for each component. Then, we compute the relative weight of each com-
ponent z on the output doppelganger gap in the following way:
weight of z c,t =
zc,t − z
dop
c,t
GDPc,t −GDP
dop
c,t
(7)
where z is either private consumption, government consumption, investment, exports, or
imports, the subscript c stands for one of the twelve treated countries, and the subscript t
represents the time period. Thereafter, we calculate the percent doppelganger gap for GDP
as follows:
percent output doppelganger gap c,t =
GDPc,t −GDP
dop
c,t
GDP
dop
c,t
(8)
Showing the treatment effect in percent terms allows a direct interpretation of how much
larger/smaller the GDP is due to the Euro accession. Finally, we multiply the relative weight
of each doppelganger gap zc,t by the percent output doppelganger gap. This allows us to
understand the direct contribution of each channel on the treatment effect.
Figure 7 depicts, for each country, the percent GDP gap in 2007 and its decomposition
into private consumption, government consumption, investment and net exports. It clearly
shows that countries experienced the Euro accession heterogeneously. 17
We now take a deeper look into the countries which were significantly affected as argued
in Section 3.2.
For Ireland, joining the Euro area induced a 39% higher GDP compared to the counter-
factual scenario of not adopting the common currency. Even though all GDP components
contribute positively for this result, the private consumption and investment together can
explain almost 80% of the total output gain from the treatment.
17See Table 7 for the exact values depicted in the Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Doppelganger gaps and GDP components
Notes: The black dot depicts, for each country, the percent doppelganger gap of output computed
as in Equation 8. The stacked bars represent the contribution of each GDP component for these
gaps. For each component, we multiply the weight of the component (Equation 7) by the percent
doppelganger gap of GDP (Equation 8). The sum of the values for each component sum up the
percent doppelganger gap. The values represent the cumulative effect of the Euro accession since
they are computed for 2007, the last year of the analysis.
Table 7 also shows that the reasons behind the economic slowdown experienced by some
countries at the Euro accession differ from country to country. We find that for France and
Portugal, the private consumption and the net exports accounted for a large share of the
GDP gap. For Germany and Italy, it is the doppelganger difference in private consumption
alongside with investment that better explain the negative economic impact of the Euro on
GDP.
Before the Euro, the need to exchange local currencies implied extra transaction costs
and exchange rate risk. The single currency was expected to boost cross-border trade and
investment between the member states since doing business in the euro area would be more
cost efficient and less risky (De Grauwe (2020)). For third parties, the Euro area would be
as well an attractive place to invest. Consumers would benefit from price transparency and
stability. Therefore, roughly, it would be expected an increase in investment, exports, and
imports but it is not clear in which direction the trade balance would change.
Table 8 indeed reveals that, with the exception of France and Italy, all countries had
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a higher trade volume than if they had not adopted the common currency. This result
is in accordance to Baldwin et al. (2008) and Schmitz and Von Hagen (2011) who argue
that the Euro has significantly promoted trade in the Eurozone countries. Yet, net exports
changed differently across countries. Only Germany and Ireland experienced significant net
trade benefits from the Euro accession. Similarly, even though the common currency was
expected to attract foreign investment for the whole Euro area, Ireland stands out from
the remaining member countries. Investment in Ireland increased significantly because of
the Euro adoption. Therefore, country specific characteristics have significantly shaped the
impact Euro across member states.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we study the impact of the European monetary union accession on the
macroeconomic performance of the first twelve member states. We use the synthetic control
method to construct a counterfactual of these countries’ GDP. This method allows building a
doppelganger which should represent the economic activity of these countries in the absence
of the Euro adoption.
Our findings suggest that there are mild losers (France, Germany, Italy, and Portugal) and
a clear winner (Ireland). Notwithstanding, the drivers of such estimates are heterogeneous
as our GDP decomposition analysis indicates. Even though trade has increased substantially
with the adoption of a common currency, only Germany and Ireland benefited in net terms.
Moreover, the common currency adoption especially boosted investment in Ireland.
These evidence points out to the importance of analyzing in detail the heterogeneous
responses of GDP components and their implications. For example, given the different
responses of investment and government consumption across member states, it is natural
to ask if the effectiveness of national fiscal policies has changed. This could be especially
interesting given that, with the common currency adoption, countries forgo some important
policy instruments.
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A Appendix
A.1 Variables description and source
Table 2: Variables’ Description
Variable code Description Source
rgdpna Real gross domestic product at constant 2011 na-
tional prices in million 2011 US dollars normalized
to unity in 1970.
PWT 9.1
emp Total employment - number of persons engaged in
millions.
PWT 9.1
csh prod Labor productivity growth computed by taking
the log-difference between real gdp and total em-
ployment
PWT 9.1
pop Total population in millions. PWT 9.1
csh emp Employment share - ratio between total employ-
ment and total population
PWT 9.1
csh c Private consumption expenditure (% of GDP) ob-
tained by subtracting general government final
consumption expenditure to the series of final con-
sumption expenditure
World Bank
csh g General government final consumption expendi-
ture (% of GDP)
World Bank
csh i Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) World Bank
csh x Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) World Bank
csh m Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) World Bank
Notes: All variables collected directly from the Penn World Table are from version 9.1 (PWT 9.1)
(Feenstra et al., 2015). All level variables are in real terms and at annual frequency spanning the
year 1970 until 2007. GDP components were collected from the World Bank database in shares of
GDP. The data were collected on the 30-10-2019.
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A.2 Comparison Tables
Table 3: Predictors’ means (in %) for each country during pre-treatment period
Variable Names Country Doppelganger
Austria
Share of Priv. Consumption 56.27 51.57
Share of Gov. Consumption 17.91 20.58
Share of Investment 26.53 26.27
Share of Imports 32.57 32.35
Share of Exports 31.85 33.93
Employment Share 45.16 48.33
Labor productivity growth 2.47 2.07
Belgium
Share of Priv. Consumption 54.14 54.15
Share of Gov. Consumption 21.41 20.59
Share of Investment 22.87 24.74
Share of Imports 53.80 36.03
Share of Exports 55.39 36.55
Employment Share 38.01 49.41
Labor productivity growth 2.33 1.57
Finland
Share of Priv. Consumption 52.51 52.30
Share of Gov. Consumption 19.38 19.96
Share of Investment 26.66 26.54
Share of Imports 26.57 26.66
Share of Exports 28.02 27.86
Employment Share 47.26 47.22
Labor productivity growth 3.08 1.87
France
Share of Priv. Consumption 55.16 56.10
Share of Gov. Consumption 21.24 19.47
Share of Investment 23.11 23.42
Share of Imports 20.54 21.50
Share of Exports 21.03 22.51
Employment Share 40.49 43.80
Labor productivity growth 2.20 1.23
Continued on next page...
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... table 3 continued
Variable Names Country Doppelganger
Germany
Share of Priv. Consumption 57.15 57.29
Share of Gov. Consumption 19.68 18.18
Share of Investment 24.50 24.30
Share of Imports 21.40 21.25
Share of Exports 20.06 21.48
Employment Share 48.36 48.23
Labor productivity growth 2.41 1.48
Greece
Share of Priv. Consumption 63.06 60.84
Share of Gov. Consumption 16.75 17.21
Share of Investment 26.46 22.76
Share of Imports 21.77 17.88
Share of Exports 15.50 17.07
Employment Share 38.77 45.51
Labor productivity growth 1.69 1.21
Ireland
Share of Priv. Consumption 61.17 55.50
Share of Gov. Consumption 18.72 24.34
Share of Investment 21.65 24.24
Share of Imports 52.85 34.67
Share of Exports 51.30 30.59
Employment Share 35.36 39.90
Labor productivity growth 3.43 2.14
Italy
Share of Priv. Consumption 59.00 58.72
Share of Gov. Consumption 17.55 17.63
Share of Investment 22.87 23.15
Share of Imports 19.28 19.37
Share of Exports 19.86 19.86
Employment Share 38.25 44.11
Labor productivity growth 2.48 1.24
Luxembourg
Continued on next page...
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... table 3 continued
Variable Names Country Doppelganger
Share of Priv. Consumption 48.16 58.05
Share of Gov. Consumption 15.33 10.82
Share of Investment 22.57 29.26
Share of Imports 81.83 39.32
Share of Exports 95.78 41.20
Employment Share 46.63 51.00
Labor productivity growth 1.81 1.54
The Netherlands
Share of Priv. Consumption 50.90 54.78
Share of Gov. Consumption 21.94 18.40
Share of Investment 22.62 26.16
Share of Imports 47.47 37.62
Share of Exports 52.01 38.27
Employment Share 43.78 49.70
Labor productivity growth 1.56 1.48
Portugal
Share of Priv. Consumption 66.93 65.45
Share of Gov. Consumption 14.03 13.91
Share of Investment 26.93 21.36
Share of Imports 31.16 21.84
Share of Exports 23.27 21.12
Employment Share 41.81 38.57
Labor productivity growth 2.02 1.29
Spain
Share of Priv. Consumption 63.12 61.46
Share of Gov. Consumption 14.51 14.58
Share of Investment 23.78 23.82
Share of Imports 18.55 17.34
Share of Exports 17.13 17.47
Employment Share 35.38 43.58
Labor productivity growth 2.56 1.10
Notes: Predictors’ means for each country during the pre-treatment period. All numbers are in
percent. Variables definitions can be find in Table 2.
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A.3 Weights Table
Table 4: Composition of each doppelganger: country weights (in %)
Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain
Australia < 0.1 < 0.1 26.6 < 0.1 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 15.6
Canada < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1
Chile < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 22.0 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1
Denmark < 0.1 46.5 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 26.4 < 0.1 < 0.1
Iceland < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 0.2 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1
Israel < 0.1 13.2 < 0.1 < 0.1 0.9 3.1 50.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 13.5 < 0.1 2.0
Korea < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 14.0 < 0.1 4.0 < 0.1
Mexico < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 29.2 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 22.4 < 0.1 < 0.1 43.0 18.5
New Zealand < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 42.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1
Norway 48.2 7.2 33.9 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 27.9 < 0.1 0.2 13.0 < 0.1 < 0.1
Sweden 33.9 < 0.1 29.0 57.8 31.8 < 0.1 < 0.1 34.9 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1
Switzerland 7.2 33.1 4.2 < 0.1 17.4 < 0.1 < 0.1 5.6 85.8 47.1 5.1 17.6
United Kingdom 10.7 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 4.0 < 0.1 < 0.1 47.9 < 0.1
United States < 0.1 < 0.1 6.2 13.0 49.6 54.8 < 0.1 33.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 46.2
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A.4 RMSPE
Table 5: Relative root mean squared prediction error of the pre- and post- treatment doppelganger gaps.
AUS CAN CHL DNK ISL ISR KOR MEX NZL NOR SWE CHE GBR USA Treated P-Value (ρ)
AUT 2.98 5.00 2.85 4.50 1.73 1.25 2.93 4.35 3.10 7.64 4.41 3.24 1.16 3.97 3.20 0.533
BEL 2.86 4.57 2.85 5.97 3.01 1.79 2.93 4.35 3.28 5.66 4.41 3.24 1.51 5.19 3.40 0.467
FIN 2.61 5.28 2.85 4.42 2.89 1.25 2.93 4.35 3.30 7.65 3.64 3.24 1.33 3.88 1.78 0.867
FRA 2.99 2.49 2.85 4.34 1.61 1.25 2.93 4.35 3.14 7.37 2.47 3.24 1.54 4.04 4.97 0.133
DEU 2.80 4.74 2.85 4.98 2.88 1.25 2.93 4.35 3.30 7.65 4.40 3.24 1.22 2.86 5.98 0.133
GRC 2.81 3.83 2.59 4.83 3.49 2.38 2.74 5.15 3.63 5.93 4.66 3.04 1.33 5.21 0.48 1.000
IRL 2.81 5.34 1.04 4.37 2.00 8.16 2.93 4.35 2.81 8.77 4.40 3.24 1.82 5.19 15.51 0.067
ITA 1.95 3.65 2.85 4.82 1.82 1.25 2.93 3.52 3.16 7.65 4.40 3.24 1.17 5.38 7.88 0.067
LUX 2.70 5.69 2.85 5.90 1.97 1.25 2.93 4.35 2.71 7.35 4.40 3.24 2.43 3.88 3.69 0.467
NLD 2.95 5.74 2.85 7.06 2.56 1.25 2.93 4.35 2.55 7.45 4.41 3.24 1.61 3.87 1.79 0.867
PRT 3.02 5.23 2.85 4.70 3.01 1.27 2.93 3.66 2.88 7.50 4.40 3.24 1.85 3.86 6.26 0.133
ESP 1.95 4.84 2.85 4.81 1.77 1.25 2.93 4.35 3.24 7.65 4.40 3.24 1.77 3.92 1.45 0.933
Notes: The column Treated displays the RMSPE ratio for each country, χ in equation 5. The
column P-Value tell us the chances of obtaining a ratio as high as the treated country if one were
to pick a country at random from the sample including also the treated country, ρ in equation 6.
Given the small number of donor countries, we consider the results significant if there at most 2
countries with a higher RMSPE ratio. For example, for Ireland there is only 1 out of 15 countries
with an RMSPE ratio of at least 15.51 yielding a p-value of 0.067.
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A.5 In-time placebo test
Figure 8: In-time placebo test - 1995
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Notes: In each graph, the blue dashed line represents the normalized real GDP for the synthetic
country and the black full line represents the series for the actual country. The vertical line depicts
the placebo treatment period - 1995 for all countries. For all countries the analysis starts in 1970
and ends in 2007. This date is particularly useful to analyze because it is the one used by Puzzello
and Gomis-Porqueras (2018). The reasons on why we do not use it are explained in the main text
with the most compelling being that Austria and Finland are being analyzed in our work but they
joined the EU in 1995.
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Figure 9: In-time placebo test - 1998
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Notes: In each graph, the blue dashed line represents the normalized real GDP for the synthetic
country and the black full line represents the series for the actual country. The vertical line depicts
the placebo treatment period - 1998 for all countries. For all countries the analysis starts in 1970
and ends in 2007.
A.6 Changing donor pool
In each of the following set of graphs, the blue dashed line represents the normalized real
GDP for the synthetic country and the black full line represents the series for the actual
country. The vertical line depicts the treatment period. For all countries the analysis starts
in 1970 and ends in 2007. We iteratively exclude different countries from the donor pool as
argued in Section 3.3.1.
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Figure 10: SCM without Australia
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Figure 11: SCM without Israel
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34
Figure 12: SCM without Mexico
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Figure 13: SCM without Norway
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Figure 14: SCM without Switzerland
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Figure 15: SCM without the United States
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Table 6: Composition of each doppelganger: country weights (in %)
Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain
Australia 18.1 < 0.1 39.6 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 0.1
Canada < 0.1 < 0.1 22.6 52.0 18.3 < 0.1 < 0.1 32.4 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1
Chile < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 22.0 < 0.1 5.2 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1
Iceland < 0.1 < 0.1 17.2 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1
Israel 16.4 24.6 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 50.1 < 0.1 52.3 12.0 15.1 4.0
Korea < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 1.9 < 0.1
Mexico 1.8 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 39.8 17.5
New Zealand 18.6 < 0.1 < 0.1 32.9 10.4 30.8 < 0.1 4.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1
Norway 13.3 < 0.1 < 0.1 15.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 27.9 < 0.1 < 0.1 22.6 < 0.1 < 0.1
Switzerland 31.8 75.4 20.6 < 0.1 35.6 2.6 < 0.1 12.2 42.5 65.4 26.7 21.3
United States < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 35.7 66.6 < 0.1 51.3 < 0.1 < 0.1 16.6 57.1
A.7 Components analysis
37
Figure 16: Components of Austria’s GDP
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(f) Net Exports
Notes: The plots depict, for each GDP component, the deviation in percent from the value of 1970.
The blue dashed lines represents the synthetic Austria computed in section 2. The full black lines
stand for the actual Austrian series.
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Figure 17: Components of Belgium’s GDP
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(f) Net Exports
Notes: The plots depict, for each GDP component, the deviation in percent from the value of 1970.
The blue dashed lines represents the synthetic Austria computed in section 2. The full black lines
stand for the actual Belgian series.
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Figure 18: Components of Finland’s GDP
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(f) Net Exports
Notes: The plots depict, for each GDP component, the deviation in percent from the value of 1970.
The blue dashed lines represents the synthetic Belgium computed in section 2. The full black lines
stand for the actual Finnish series.
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Figure 19: Components of France’s GDP
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(f) Net Exports
Notes: The plots depict, for each GDP component, the deviation in percent from the value of 1970.
The blue dashed lines represents the synthetic France computed in section 2. The full black lines
stand for the actual French series.
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Figure 20: Components of Germany’s GDP
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(f) Net Exports
Notes: The plots depict, for each GDP component, the deviation in percent from the value of 1970.
The blue dashed lines represents the synthetic Germany computed in section 2. The full black lines
stand for the actual German series.
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Figure 21: Components of Greece’s GDP
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(f) Net Exports
Notes: The plots depict, for each GDP component, the deviation in percent from the value of 1970.
The blue dashed lines represents the synthetic Greece computed in section 2. The full black lines
stand for the actual Greek series.
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Figure 22: Components of Ireland’s GDP
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(f) Net Exports
Notes: The plots depict, for each GDP component, the deviation in percent from the value of 1970.
The blue dashed lines represents the synthetic Ireland computed in section 2. The full black lines
stand for the actual Irish series.
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Figure 23: Components of Italy’s GDP
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(f) Net Exports
Notes: The plots depict, for each GDP component, the deviation in percent from the value of 1970.
The blue dashed lines represents the synthetic Italy computed in section 2. The full black lines
stand for the actual Italian series.
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Figure 24: Components of Luxembourg’s GDP
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(f) Net Exports
Notes: The plots depict, for each GDP component, the deviation in percent from the value of 1970.
The blue dashed lines represents the synthetic Luxembourg computed in section 2. The full black
lines stand for the actual Luxembourgers series.
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Figure 25: Components of The Netherlands’s GDP
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(f) Net Exports
Notes: The plots depict, for each GDP component, the deviation in percent from the value of 1970.
The blue dashed lines represents the synthetic Netherlands computed in section 2. The full black
lines stand for the actual Dutch series.
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Figure 26: Components of Portugal’s GDP
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(f) Net Exports
Notes: The plots depict, for each GDP component, the deviation in percent from the value of 1970.
The blue dashed lines represents the synthetic Portugal computed in section 2. The full black lines
stand for the actual Portuguese series.
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Figure 27: Components of Spain’s GDP
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(f) Net Exports
Notes: The plots depict, for each GDP component, the deviation in percent from the value of 1970.
The blue dashed lines represents the synthetic Spain computed in section 2. The full black lines
stand for the actual Spanish series.
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A.8 What explains the doppelganger gap? - Re do this table in
Stata and add column to display the Euro per capita impact
of the doppelganger gap
Table 7: What explains the cumulative doppelganger gap?
Private Government
Investment
Net
Doppelganger Gap
Consumption Consumption Exports
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) Euro per capita
Austria 3.77 -2.48 -1.73 -4.96 -5.40 -1,712
Belgium -3.35 1.08 -1.39 -2.02 -5.68 -1,668
Finland 1.69 1.93 0.06 -0.97 2.72 777
France -5.02 1.31 -2.40 -2.86 -8.97 -2,632
Germany -12.18 -2.34 -6.43 4.70 -16.25 -5,788
Greece -0.83 2.83 1.87 -8.94 -5.07 -1,098
Ireland 11.36 4.31 18.51 4.90 39.09 10,781
Italy -10.31 -1.79 -5.33 -0.93 -18.36 -6,089
Luxembourg -16.84 5.92 -4.37 27.86 12.57 4,697
Netherlands -4.28 6.05 -0.27 -0.98 0.52 168
Portugal -7.46 2.07 -0.92 -5.86 -12.17 -2,558
Spain -2.99 4.35 7.65 -5.11 3.90 900
Notes: This table summarizes the cumulative doppelganger gaps for each Euro member country and
presents the channels driving the impact of the accession by decomposing GDP into its components.
The doppelganger gap represents the percentage GDP gain/loss in 2007 from adopting the common
currency, i.e. for country c we define percent doppelganger gap2007,c =
GDP2007,c−GDP
dop
2007,c
GDP
dop
2007,c
. Then,
the table shows the contribution of each GDP component for the GDP gain/loss. Values are
constructed in a way to sum up to the doppelganger gap. The decomposition of net exports into
exports and imports is presented in Table 8.
50
Table 8: Net exports decomposition
Net Exports Exports Imports
Austria -4.96 5.56 10.52
Belgium -2.02 21.17 23.19
Finland -0.97 7.91 8.88
France -2.86 -11.70 -8.84
Germany 4.70 4.50 -0.20
Greece -8.94 1.62 10.56
Ireland 4.90 69.94 65.04
Italy -0.93 -8.74 -7.81
Luxembourg 27.86 147.85 119.99
Netherlands -0.98 15.38 16.35
Portugal -5.86 -1.37 4.49
Spain -5.11 1.84 6.95
Notes: This table presents the summary of the net exports decomposition into exports and imports
for each treated country. It tells us how much did net exports contributed to the doppelganger gap.
For example, the Austrian GDP is 4.96% smaller than of its doppelganger due to net exports. Even
though exports contributed to an increase of 5.56% of GDP, imports contributed to a decrease of
about 10.52% of GDP.
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